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By a letter from the President of the Ettropean Parliament dated 10 October 1969 the Committee on External Trade 
Relations u•as authorized to s11bnut a report on trade relations betu·een the Six and ]upan. As early as 24 February 1969 
the Committee had requested Mr. Rtas to giz•e close attention to this matter and to sttbmzt a report thereon. 
The Committee on External Trade Relations examined this report at its meetings of 16 December 1969 and 22 january 
1970; at the latter meeting, the motion for a resolution and explanatory statement rel,tting thereto u·ere unanimously 
adopted tl'ith one abstention. 
The follou•ing u·ere present: Messrs. Kriedemann, Acting-Chairman; ll7esterterp, Vice-Ch,urman; Baas, Rapporteur; Artzinger, 
Bading, Boano, Bas, Bo11squet, d'Angelosante, De l17inter, DezNtlf ( dep11tizing for Air. Hahn), Fellermazer, Miss Flesch, 
Messrs. Klinker, Lohr, Ric harts (deputizing for Mr. Mitterdorfer!, Vetrone and Vredeling. 
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A 
The Committee on External Trade Relations hereby submits to the European Parliament the following 
motion for a resolution and explanatory statement: 
Motion for a resolution 
on trade relations between the Six and Japan 
The Emopea11 Parliament, 
a) having regard to Japan's importance as a world trade partner, 
b) having regard to the rapid growth of the Japanese economic potential, 
c) having regard to the report of the Committee on External Trade Relations 
(Doc. 212/69), 
d) having heard the oral report of the representative of the Commission of the 
European Communities, 
1. Finds that, for a number of years, the member States, as a Community, have 
generally had a passive attitude in regard to taking practical steps for co-ordinating 
and unifying their divergent systems of trade relations with Japan; 
2. Is gratified to note, therefore, that, on 10 November 1969, the Council of 
the European Communities empowered the European Commission to initiate 
exploratory talks with Japan with a view to arriving at a Community agreement 
with that country; 
3. Hopes that the Japanese Government will give a favourable reply to the offer 
of negotiations of the European Communities, this being, at the expiry of the 
transitional phase, the only possible method of finding constructive solutions to the 
problems of mutual trade relations; 
4. Considers that these trade negot1at1ons should lead to a progressive and 
extensive liberalization of trade between the two parties trusts that Japan will 
be similarly inclined; 
5. Invites the European Commission to see to it that a common list of products 
is established for the Community market which is circumscribed by a uniform customs 
frontier; the sensitivity of these products would warrant, with regard to their 
importation from Japan, special measures or even the provisional retention of quotas; 
6. Is of the opinion that the establishment of closer contacts between the 
economies of Japan and the EEC, whose structures differ in certain respects, make 
it necessary to include in the future agreement a safeguard clause that would be 
applicable in cases of actual or potential market disturbances due to imports from 
the partner countries; 
7. Lays down as a principle that, under the future agreement, it shall be possible 
for the two contracting parties to resort to this safeguard clause on a basis of full 
reciprocity and that, with regard to the European Community which is also a single 
market for third countries, the clause shall be applied in an entirely uniform manner; 
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8. Points out that the dynamic expansion of both the Japanese and the European 
economies in regard to technology and specialization cannot make further progress 
unless these areas can depend, for the marketing of their products, on ever-larger 
markets, and would therefore draw the attention of the Council of the European 
Communities and of the European Commission to the fact that modern trade relations 
between the Community and Japan cannot remain restricted to regulations on trade 
between the two parties but must consist in wider economic co-operation in all fields 
of common interest such as the free movement of capital between the two parties, 
the position of the parties on the world raw materials market, world development 
problems, etc.; 
9. Is convinced that such an agreement, concluded between two influential 
partners in world trade, will contribute not only to the economic expansion of the 
two parties but also to the harmonious development of the whole of world trade; 
10. Requests its Committee concerned to follow very closely the development of 
questions relating to trade between the EEC and Japan and to consider the possibility 
of establishing contacts with members of the Japanese Parliament; 
11. Invites its President to forward this resolution and the report of its Committee 
concerned to the Council and to the Commission of the European Communities as 
well as, for information, to the Japanese Government and Parliament. 
. i 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
!-Background to the question 
of trade relations between the EEC 
and Japan 
a) Historical survey 
1. As early as 1963 the former Committee on 
External Trade Relations had been apprised, for 
information, of a carefully substantiated proposal 
for a decision(!) on relations between the Com-
munity and Japan. This document was an attempt 
on the part of the Commission to obtain the 
Council's authorization to start exploratory talks 
with Japan on the possibility of concluding a trade 
agreement between that country and the Community. 
This draft mandate for negotiations with Japan 
came within the context of the implementation of 
the action programme which the Council had 
adopted on 25 September 1962e). The Executive 
stressed the need for a trade agreement with Japan 
and very aptly pointed out-in the Opinion 
of the Committee on External Trade Rela-
tions-the disparities between the various import 
systems applied to Japan by the member States, and 
the difficulties that might arise from these differen-
ces with regard to the abolition of customs barriers 
between the member States. (Proof of these dif-
fKulties may be seen in the number of claims by· 
member States to Article 115 of the EEC Treaty; 
these problems had, as a matter of fact, been 
examined as early as 1959 by the Working Party 
set up by the member States for the implementation 
of Article 115 of the EEC Treaty.) (3 ) 
2. In its explanatory statement on the draft 
decision of 1963, the Executive dealt with the 
matter at great length. It stressed the fact that 
while, at the beginning of the sixties, the volume 
of trade with Japan was no more than 1 to 2 per 
cent of the whole of the external trade of the 
member States, this proportion could only increase. 
In view of the rate of expansion of Japan's economy 
that country had to find new markets. This explains 
I') Doc. !/COM 163) 245 of 26.6.G3; Memo to Members of 9.9.63. 
I') Official Gazette No. 90, p. 2353/62. 
I") See para. ·L 
its joining GATT in 1955 and the OECD in 1964. 
However, Japan remains handicapped by its import 
system which is still highly protectionist, as well 
as by the level of costs which, at the time and for 
certain products at least, was relatively low and 
virtually an obstacle to imports. 
3. The Commission also emphasized the differen-
ces of opinion among the member States as to 
what their trade policies should be in relation to 
Japan. When Japan joined GATT in 1955, France 
and the Benelux countries referred to Article XXXV 
of the General Agreement (exclusion from GATT's 
preferential treatment). In 1963, France and the 
Benelux countries renounced their right to invoke 
Article XXXV and, instead, agreed with Japan on 
the introduction of a safeguard clause. The Federal 
Republic of Germany and Italy had not referred to 
Article XXXV of the General Agreement so that 
these two countries have no legal grounds for 
excluding Japan from the benefit of GATT's prefer-
ential system. 
4. In 1959 the Executive had preliminary discus-
sions with the Six and the Japanese Mission in 
Brussels on a common list of products regarded as 
'sensitive' by the Community, and on a safeguard 
clause designed to protect these products. As a 
result of these talks, the harmonization of trade 
policies in relation to Japan became one of the 
key points of the Council's programme of work 
for 1962. 
The Commission's aim was to promote a gradual 
increase of trade with Japan. This implied liberali-
zation measures and, at the same time, steps to 
prevent any mutual market disturbances. In 1963, 
the main concern was therefore the concluding of 
an essentially non-tariff agreement. 
5. In its explanatory statement on the 1963 draft 
decision, the EEC Commission also stressed the fact 
that the Community's position for starting negotia-
tions did not improve with time, particularly in 
view of the appreciable decrease in the number of 
discriminatory import quotas between 1960 and 
1963 and the continuing drop in these quotas as 
a result of bilateral negotiations between the 
member countries and Japan or other measures. 
Thus the 'Community average' was constantly fall-
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ing and this automatically reduced the possibilities 
for concession to Japane). 
In addition, at the beginning of 1963 Japan 
renounced its right to resort to Article XII of GATT 
(balance-of-payments difficulties); consequently, 
Japan was necessarily supposed to be in a position 
further to liberalize its imports; on the other hand, 
a more marked liberalizing trend towards Japan 
appeared in the member countries of the OECD, 
on the very eve, so to speak, of the Kennedy Round 
of negotiations. This liberalization could only make 
near-tariff protection measures more urgent. 
This accounts for the fact that the European 
Parliament(~) and the Economic and Social Com-
mittee both urged on 27 March 1963 that the prob-
lems of quotas t•is-a-t•is Japan be tackled as soon 
as possible. 
6. Among the results achieved in 1963, the 
following may be mentioned: 
i) The adding to the common customs tariff of 
a joint right (i.e. more specific ad valorem) for 
ceramic products(3 ). 
ii) The signing, during the Dillon negouatwns, of 
a limited tariff agreeme1tf with Japan (applying 
to products of a commercial value of $5,000m 
in both directions) ( 4). 
iii) The global tre,ttment applied by the member 
States, under the International Agreement of 
1962 on cotton textiles, to their import quotas. 
iv) Prelimi11ary co1lSultations on an agreement be-
tween the Community and Japan, in accordance 
with the Council decision of 9 October 1961 
concerning a consultation procedure for negotia-
tions on agreements in respect of trade relations 
between the member States and third coun-
tries("). 
v) The Council decision of 13 and 14 Novem-
ber 1962(n) on the inclusion of a Community 
safeguard clause in trade agreements between 
member States and Japan. In fact, while 
member States were prepared to adopt this 
provision, its implementation was opposed by 
the Japanese Governement which stated that it 
was not prepared to extend the effects of the 
safeguard clause to all member States. 
The EEC Commission was, therefore, fully 
justified in considering that the results achieved 
with regard to co-ordinating and unifying the trade 
policies of the Six in relation to Japan were only 
a 'minimum' and had a purely 'fragmentary' 
character. 
(') Smce then, thrs aveuge fell again by one half 
1'1 ResolutiOn 111 Offw,ll G,zzettc No. 61, p. 1279/63. 
(") Common Customs Tariff, Chapter 69; Offtcial Gazette L 172/69, 
p.1ge 253, et seq 
('I EEC Bullctm No. 8'62, p. 18. 
(') OfftCial G.1~ctte No. 71, p. 1273101. 
(0 ) Not publrshed. 
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7. In a supplementary document issued in 
1964('), the Executive added to its remarks of the 
previous year that there was more scope for bilateral 
agreements between member States and Japan, that 
it was technically possible to introduce Com-
munity provrsrons for controlling Community 
quotas and applying a Community safeguard 
clause and, lastly, that the signing of a Com-
munity agreement did not necessarily exclude, 
at least for the transitional period of the EEC 
Treaty, supplementary agreements between the 
mem~er States and Japan. Finally, the Executive 
suggested that provision be made in the negotiating 
mandate for a minimum negative list (including 
products regarded as 'sensitive' by all member 
States) as well as a maximum negative list (includ-
ing all products regarded as sensitive by the various 
member States), and only to draw up a final list at 
the close of the negotiations. 
8. This additional document does not appear to 
have been of any help either in proceeding to 
practical measures. 
The reason for referring here to these old 
proposals is to show that the Executive had been 
aware from the very beginning of the problems 
arising in this matter. It seems, however, that it 
did not sufficiently draw the Council's attention to 
these problems. Anyway, time has passed and it 
must be admitted th:n nothing has been done so far. 
The Committee on External Relations is there-
fore glad to observe that the Council of Ministers, 
too, has recently realized the need for an early start 
to negotiations with Japan( 8). 
b) ],tp:m's foreigll polwy 
9. \'V'ith regard to foreign policy, the posrtwn 
of Japan as a major economic power in Asiae) 
is governed by its rehtions with the United States, 
the USSR, the People's RepuHic of China and the 
other countries of the Pacific Ocean-including, on 
the o·-e h:wd. India and Indonesia and, on the other, 
Australia and New Zealand-and by its present and 
future position in relation to the United Nations. 
Pro'· lems arising from this particular situation will 
not 1:-e deJlt with in detail in this report; it is, 
however, necessary to bring into relief certain 
aspects of that position, for general guidance, so 
th:tt the question of relations between Japan and 
the EEC shoul:l not be looked at from too exclusively 
a Europe.m angle or from a purely commercial view-
point. In addition, this information should make 
in possible to form an indirect idea of the aims 
and political consequences of a trade agreement 
between the EEC and Japan. 
Japan's foreign policy is laid down in the 
Constitution itself. This includes, in particular, 
(') Doc !!COM (641, 52 Fmal of 26 February 1964. Memo to 
1\lemhcrs uf 6 Mav J%4. 
('') The Umtcd Kingdom, tuo, is at present giving close attention to 
Jt\ trJde IL·l.:ttwns \Ylth J.lp.m 
I'') In C,!Jrch 1970, a \\ orld exhrbitron \\ rll be held for the first time 
111 a country of AsiJ.. 
highly restnctlve provisions regarding the country's 
armaments; hence defence expenditure is only 1 per 
cent of the national income. These constitutional 
points should of course be borne in mind in dealing 
with this report. 
10. From a political viewpoint, relations between 
Japan and the United States are dominated at the 
moment bv the question of the eventual return to 
Japan of Okinawa (and the other Ryukyu Islands). 
From a legal viewpoint, the question to be deter-
mined is whether the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation 
and Security signed by the United States and Japan 
in 1960-a highly controversial document at the 
time-will be extended. 
Under the agreement conchdd between Presi-
dent Nixon and Prime Minister Sato on 21 Novem-
1:-er 1969, Okinawa will return to Japan in 1972 
while, meantime, all American nuclear weapons will 
most probably be withdrawn. The Security Treaty 
will be renewed and extended to the Ryukyu 
Ishnds. American bases (of which there are about 
60 in Japan proper) will be retained. 
This agreement is of considerable importance 
with regard to security in the Far East as it affects 
not only Japan but also South Korea and Taiwan 
(Formosa), particularly in view of the fact that the 
British are due to withr1raw from Malaysia and 
Singapore in 1971. 
For the time being the Japanese Government 
IS not allowed to take over from the United States 
militar7 assignments in the Far East and can, there-
fore, confine itself to contributing to the area's 
economic development. 
This agreement enabled Prime Minister Sato's 
Liberal Party to strengthen by about 5 per cent its 
majority in the elections held on 28 December 1969. 
It is to be expected, however, that opposition from 
the Left will violently oppose approval of the treaty. 
In addition, it should be noted that with regard 
to fl"<t'!e policy the American-Japanese trade balance 
will show, for summer 1969, a surplus of about 
~1,500m( 1 ) in favour of Japan, while American 
economy has recently been showing signs of stress. 
11. In July 1968 Japan signed with the USSR 
a barter agreement for the exploitation of Siberian 
wood; this was accepted by Japan (with the excep-
tion of a 20 per cent payment in cash) as a counter-
part for the supply of grubbing equipment (for 
acout $130m). 
Through this agreement Japan will initially 
endeavour to pave the way for the return of the 
Kurilskie Islands. As for the Soviet Union, its 
aim is to deflect Japanese trade-which, at the 
moment, is essentially directed towards the United 
(1) 1968 $!,100m; 1972 (forecast): $3,000m. 
States-whilst trying at the same time, through 
closer links with Japan, to consolidate its posltlon 
ris-a-1:is the People's Republic of China(2). The 
agreement in question shows a further improvement 
in relations between Japan and the USSR. The 
improvement began in 1960 as a result of the 
tension between China and the Soviet Union. In 
addition, as part of the development of Siberia, the 
USSR propose to sell to Japan petroleum, natural 
gas, copper, coal and iron ore in exchange for the 
supply of pipelines and plant for the port of 
Nachodka (near Vladisvostok). 
In general, Japan takes a more reserved attitude 
than the Soviet Union in this matter in order not 
to prejudice its own relations with the People's 
Republic of China. While the treaty concluded 
in 1950 between the Soviet Union and China is 
of no relevance now, the fact remains that it was 
originally directed against Japan. 
12. An unofficial agreement was signed in 1962 
with the People's Rep!!blic of Cbi11a: this led to 
what is commonly known as the 'Commerce 
Memorandum'. It was renewed at the beginning 
of 1969 but its scope was reduced. On the Japanese 
side, there is a sort of pragmatic objectivity whereby 
l::usiness and politics are treated separately, Japan's 
main interest being in a Chinese market of about 
700 million people which it regards more as an 
outlet than as a competitor. China, for its part, 
seems to be rather favourably inclined towards estab-
lishing diplomatic contacts with Japan. However, 
it should not be expecteJ that relations in the proper 
sense of the word will shortly be established between 
these two countries, especially as, in theory, they 
are still in a state of w:tr and Japan does not 
recognize the Chinese 1'egime set up in 1949(3). 
In short, relations between Japan and the 
People's Republic of China may be described as 
an effort on both sides to avoid anything that might 
raise tension to a breaking point. 
Tc;i 11'<111, on the other hand, signed a peace treaty 
with Japan witho•.tt even asking for compensation. 
Hence relations between the two countries are 
good(4). 
13. Austrdia is, after the United States, Japan's 
most important trading partner. In fact, the bulk 
of Australia's exports goes to Japan. 
Japan imports from Australia 30 per cent of its 
wool requirements, 20 per cent of its iron ore 
requirements and 40 per cent of its coke require-
ments. The corresponding figures for Australia are: 
38 per cent, 88 per cent and 97 per cent respectively. 
Japanese exports to Australia mainly consist of 
(') F.u EJ,tern Economrc Rc,-iew of 10 October 1968. 
lo;oltr'ei Obse11•,rtcur of 23 June 1969. 
(") The Japan Import-Export Bank does not grant, in principle, 
crcdrt bcrhties for trade with the People's Republic of Chrna. 
( 1) Ne11e Zurcher Zetf!tllg of 11 Apnl 1969; Fir.ancial Times of 
22 September 1969. 
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industrial products. In addition, Japan takes part 
in the construction of Australian harbours and trans-
shipment plants for coke and ores(!). 
Japan takes an active interest in Indonesia and 
its oil which is in great demand for its low sulphur 
content and, in addition, can be conveyed by a far 
less vulnerable route than through the Strait of 
Malacca. Japan buys Indonesian wood in exchange 
for which it provides financial and technical assist-
ance, essentially in connexion with rice cultivation 
and fisheries( 2). Trade with Thailand, Malaysia 
and the Philippines is quite extensive too. 
As for relations with other countries in Asia 
and the Pacific Ocean, Japan hopes, owing to its 
Constitution, to be able to restrict its share in the 
setting up of regional military blocs to supplying 
civilian personnel and technical know-how. 
It may be anticipated th:1t relations between 
Japan and Australia will increase still further in 
future. Various forms of intensive co-operation 
between the United St:ttes, Australia and Japan will 
shortly emerge in the Pacific area. 
14. In view of its economic position in the world 
today, Japan has been endeavouring for some time 
now to play, a more important part in the United 
Nations(~) and, in particular, to obtain a seat on 
the Security Council and the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference. Japan would also like Article 107 of 
the Charter to be repealed. This provides for the 
possibility of certain measures being taken against 
'former enemy countries'( 4). In case Japan were 
to be called upon to play a greater part in the 
United Nations, it could, by virtue of its present 
Constitution, contribute to the financing of the 
United Nations but not to the setting up of inter-
national police forces(5). 
15. With regard to development Japan is extremely 
active in the context of ASP AC and the Asian 
Development Bank (Manila); it created the Private 
Investment Company for Asia which includes 
112 world concerns and whose activities extend to 
all the developing countries(r.). In 1968 Japan 
contributed $1 ,OOOm towards development aid. 
Japan's foreig'1 policy aims at acquiring a posi-
tion of independence whilst maintaining good rela-
tions at once with the United States, the USSR 
and the People's Republic of China. 
(11 01ient,1[ Economist, July 1969. Thus, the Bank of Tokyo supports 
L1n wdustriL1l group for the dcyelopment of Australia's economy. 
(") Fm,mc~c1l Tl!ncs of 22 September 1969. 
(·'J It now ranh sixth in world trade and will shortly go up to 
Ihu-d pbce. 
(4) The USSR .l'kcd for this Article to be applied against the 
Fcdeul Repubhc of Germany (which IS not a member of the 
Un•ted N.uions) during the cnsis in Czechoslovakia in August 
1968. 
(') j,1pan T11nes of 15 March 1969, Eastern Econcmic Review of 
20 March 19~9. 
("I E.zstc111 Economtc Rct>iew of 20 March 1969. In addition Japau 
took part m the GATT-UNCTAD Trade PromotiOn Group. 
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c) General otttline of japan's ec0110my 
and external commerce, and its trade relations 
with the EEC 
16. Some documentary and statistical data may 
be useful to the reader at this stage of the report. 
It should first be recalled that Japan's social structure 
and, consequently, its production process, are com-
pletely different from the Western pattern. An 
essential feature of Japan's social structure is, for 
example, the sense of identification of all employed 
people with their employers' interests. Economic 
life rests, therefore, on the almost total immobility 
of labour. This phenomenon, along with a very 
high investment rate( 7), which enables industries 
to acquire sophisticated equipment and have a very 
extensive organization may account, to a large 
extent, for the successful part played by Japanese 
industry on world markets. In figures the position 
is a follows: 
For a wages increase of 19 to 20 per cent, there 
has been, in recent years, a productivity increase of 
16 per cent. Export prices have risen by 0.8 per 
cent per annum only. 
17. Japan's area is 370,000 square kilometres and 
its population exceeds 100 million. 
Japan's popuhtion trebled in the last hundred 
years. Since 1960, birth control measures have 
markedly reduced the disquieting demographic 
upsurge of the beginning of the century. 
i) Distribtttion a11d standard of lit•ing of the 
pop!1l,ttion(8 ) 
The population 1s employed as follows 1n the 
main activity areas: 
Farming and fisheries 
Industry 
Services 
19 per cent 
35 per cent 
46 per cent 
With an annual per capita income of about 
$1,350 in 1968 the Japanese standard of living is 
halfway 1::-etween that of the countries of Europe 
and that of the other Asian countries. Although 
Japan is third since 1968 on the ladder of world 
industrial powers, it is only in the twentieth position 
as regards national income (just above Italy). Japan 
expects to reach the highest per capita income in 
the world in 1988. 
From 1950 to 1968 the country's gross national 
product increased almost fourfold; from 1947 to 
1968 the ar.nual real per capita income rose by 
8.-l per cent. 
CJ ± 33 per cent of J.:tpan's natiOnal income; the investment rate 
m the U11rtcd States IS 16 per cent .:tnd in France 15 per cent. 
(') The statistical data quoted in this Chapter was kindly supplied 
h,· the Japane'e J\'lisswn to the EEC. 
With the exception of the 1965 recession year 
(5 per cent), the gross national product has risen 
every year by 10 to 12 per cent; it now (1969) 
amounts to $137,000m viz. 18.7 per cent more than 
. in 1968, the third largest figure for the whole world, 
after the United States and the USSR. 
Gross national product (in million $) 
1958: 
1968: 
26.7 
115.5 
ii) Gemral economic situation 
The reasons for this unprecedented expansion 
can only be given in outline: the people of Japan 
are characterized, as just mentioned, by their sense 
of discipline, their industriousness and adaptability. 
After the war, the Japanese Government pursued 
a very active expansion policy by giving special 
attention to advanced sectors and encouraging tech-
nical and scientific investments in preference to 
private consumption expenditure. Private enter-
prises combine patriarchal control with modern 
management methods and rational organization of 
production. In its general control of the economy, 
Japan combines market economy principles with 
long-term planning to an extent that is unparalleled 
in any other country. 
While Japan's economic policy managed to 
remain within the 'magic square' (growth, price 
stability, full employment, balance-of-payments 
equilibrium), it has, however, as we have seen, given 
more emphasis than other countries to growth. 
Since the beginning of 1950, Japan's gross national 
product (GNP) has increased every year by about 
10 per cent, that is twice the Community's rate. 
The decisive factor of that expansion is the very 
marked development of industries regarded as lead-· 
ing sectors in world economy, in particular the 
metal conversion industry and the chemical industry. 
The motor car industry, which is the key industry 
of modern economy, could serve as an example to 
many countries: in 1958 the EEC produced 384,000 
commercial vehicles, i.e. three times more than 
Japan (138,000); in 1968, on the other hand, Japan 
produced three times more (2m) than the Com-
munity ( 634,000). Production of other vehicles 
shot up in Japan from 50,600 units in 1958 to 
over 2m in 1968, while in the EEC it went up 
from 2.6 to 6.3m. If we extrapolate present growth 
rates, Japan will be, in less than ten years' time, 
the first motor car manufacturer in the world. 
Along with the faster economic growth there 
has been a relatively more pronounced inflationist 
trend in Japan than in the other main industrial 
countries. It is, however, worth noting in this 
respect that the lesser increase in , the purchasing 
power should be mainly ascribed to a particularly 
fast rise in consumer prices (index 100 in 1963; 
172 in 1968), while the indices of importance for 
Japanese exports to world markets (production 
prices, wholesale prices, terms of trade) have 
increased at the same rate or possibly at a slightly 
lesser rate than the corresponding indices for the 
Community. The reason for this is essentially the 
remarkable discipline over salaries and wages. 
Hence, in the last ten years the nominal increase 
in gross hourly salaries has not been greater than 
the increase in work productivity. 
This development has put Japan in an advan-
tageous position on the world market concerning 
manufacturing costs for a number of products and, 
as a result, Japan's balance-of-payments position 
improved considerably in the course of the past few 
years. At the end of the second world war Japan, 
like other developing countries, had to give up 
imports of consumer goods in favour of raw 
materials and essential capital goods for the recon-
struction of its industries. This was necessary in 
order to ensure the country's balance-of-payments 
equilibrium. Since about 1960 there has been a 
growing surplus in Japan's current balance of pay-
ments. This surplus-essentially due to the fact 
that exports grow faster than imports-totalled 
$871m in 1964, $2,000m in 1965 and 1966, 
$1,100m in 1967 and over $3,000m in 1968. The 
overall balance of payments, which has been show-
ing a slight surplus since 1964 (except for 1967), 
reached in 1968 the enormous surplus figure of 
$1,600m. Japanese currency reserves rose from 
$1,900m in March 1968 to $3,200m in 1969. 
iii) Prospects 
The aim which the present Japanese ten-year 
plan (1960-1970) had set itself was to double the 
gross national product; this meant an average annual 
growth of 7.2 per cent. 
The plan was based on the following estimates: 
Population (in 1,000) 
Individual income (in yens) 
Mines and industnes (per cent) 
Farming,, forestry, fishenes (per 
cent) 
Energy (in 1,000 tons of coal) 
Imports (in $1 m) 
Exports (in $1 m) 
InitL-tl 
penod 
1956-1958 
91' 110 
87' 736 
100 
100 
131,815 
2,549 
2,687 
Expected 
results 
for 1970 
102,220 
208,601 
431 
144 
302,760 
8,080 
8,485 
Reality, in fact, exceeded all expectations, since 
the figure for individual income has been doubled. 
iv) Agricultttre 
The cultivated area covers 15 per cent of the 
overall area. Intensive cultivation is essential to 
feed the population. 
The main crops are: rice, vegetables, fruit, 
tobacco, tea, mulberries (for silkworm breeding) 
and certain types of cereals. 
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Agricultural production is not sufficient to feed 
the population. In addition to exports, fisheries 
partly make up for the insufficient agricultural 
production. 1,500.000 fish:::rmen supply 45 kilos 
of fish per annum and per inhabitant. 
Despite the increase in production, agriculture's 
share in the national income shows a constant 
falling off. 
Rice (husked) 
Cereals 
Vegetables 
Fruits 
Meat 
Eggs 
Milk 
Fish 
Sugar beet 
Sugar cane 
Tobacco 
Silk (cocoons) 
Tea 
v) Industry 
jVJain agricttltttral products 
195~ 
11 '993 
3,804 
9,596 
2,786 
506 
427 
1,579 
5,163 
910 
228 
138 
117 
75 
(zn 1,000 lo11<) 
1907 
14,453 
2,241 
14,689 
4,704 
1,185 
1' 173 
3,662 
7,316 
1,984 
854 
209 
114 
85 
Japan's subsoil resources are poor. Its only ores 
of value are copper, manganese and sulphur. The 
country only produces one-fifth of the iron ore used 
by heavy industry. 
Energy sources are scarce; oil production is very 
low; coal mines are scattered and difficult to operate 
(none of them has large reserves and there is a 
complete shortage of anthracite and coking coal). 
A special effort is being made for hydro-electrical 
development. 
In spite of these serious gaps, Japanese industry 
h1s grown considerably. Highly integrated and 
concentrated in large industrial concerns, it has 
gained a major position on nearly all world markets. 
Quantity production covers not only products requir-
ing average technical knowledge but also computers, 
for example. Since 1968 Japan ranks first for ship-
building and second for motor car manufacture, 
computers, television sets, cement, rubber, textile 
flLres and phs tic materials(!). 
(1) In <>pite of the extLn,.ive indu.,triahz.ttion, there are stdl large 
numbe1s of snull cr.lft work::. \\h1ch 111J.nufacture lacquer, toys, 
chm.1, silk good~:. J.nd ,<,undir obJects. 
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The main industries are: 
Steelworks 
Ship 2uilding 
Motor cars 
Petro-chemical products 
Electrical engineering and electronics 
Mechanical engineering 
Textiles and dyes 
Cotton textiles 
Synthetic textiles 
Japan's sharp industrial expansion remains largely 
dependent, however, on external markets for its 
raw material imports; 10 per cent of its produc-
tion is exported. 
i\L1in i1ld11Stri,d products 
Product 
I
' l.Jnits 1959 
Unworked steel 1' 000 t 16,628 
Rolled steel 1 '000 t 12,099_ 
Coke 1 '000 t lO' 188 
Chemical products I, 000 t 10,554 
Textiles (yarns) I ,000 t 743 
Oil 1 '000 t 405.6 
Radio sets 1,000 10,025 
Cameras I,OOO I,844 
Motor cars 1,000 78 
Toys 1, 000 doz. 25,328 
Ind11strial prodttction i11dices 
General 
l\Imes 
Electricity and gas 
Manufacturing industries 
1938 
IOO 
IOO 
100 
IOO 
1967 
66,893 
50,510 
46,569 
35,414 
I, 719 
1,639 
30,I89 
4,063 
2,057 
30,474 
1967 
350 
367 
278 
I30 
vi) ]. p .n'J eXtUJhJl COJ/l/ilCtCe ti1ld its trade relations 
u·;th the EEC ( 1958-1968) 
In 1968 Japanese exports amounted to $13,700m 
which put the country in fourth position (the EEC 
being regarded as a single unit) among the chief 
exporting countries. As Japanese exports increase 
almost three times as fast as total world exports 
(the average annual growth rate for Japanese exports 
from 1948 to 1968 was approximately 25 per cent), 
.. 
Japan constantly improves its position and the view 
is now gaining ground that Japan might become in 
the foreseeable future the world's greatest export-
ing country. 
With 10.7 per cent of the GNP in 1968(1) 
external trade makes an important contribution to 
Japan's economy. This is now directed towards 
exports and corresponds very nearly to the economy 
of the Community (for trade with third countries 
only). A more marked direction is only to be found 
in certain EFT A countries. 
The breakdown of Japan's external trade into 
product categories clearly shows the commercial 
structure of a highly-developed industrial country 
th::tt is hrgely dependent on imported raw materials: 
nearly 33 per cent of exports cover semi-finished 
and finished products, while 40 per cent of imports 
cover raw materials, exchding mineral fuels. These, 
in turn, represent 19.3 per cent of total imports. 
With regard to the geographical distribution of 
Japan's external trade, it should be underscored that 
31.4 per cent of exports and 26.6 per cent of imports 
relate to the United States. About 29 per cent of 
exports and 16 per cent of imports concern South 
East Asia where Japan is particularly anxious to 
consolidate its economic and commercial position. 
12.5 per cent of exports are directed towards West-
ern Europe, of which 5.6 per cent go to the EEC. 
Japan's position is even weaker in the Community's 
external trade; in 1968 it represented 1.8 per cent 
of the EECs total exports to third countries and 
1.9 per cent of its imports. 
Imports and exports in 1968 totalled $652m 
and $636m respectively. As compared with the 
previous year. there was a further large increase of 
imports from Japan (+21 per cent) in 1968. The 
value of these imports ($652m) is almost equal to 
half the quantity of imports from Switzerland and 
Sweden. 
The trade bahnce with Japan is generally even. 
Following a surplus in 1967, it showed a slight 
deficit in 1968 (-$15m). 
Japan is thus still a comp,watively unimportant 
trading partner, the volume of trade between that 
country and the EEC being smaller than the EEC s 
trade with Spain, Denmark, Canada, Switzerland or 
Sweden. But Japan is, after Libya, the country 
which developed most its trade with the Community. 
From 1958 to 1968 Japanese imports increased by 
458 per cent and exports by 359 per cent. These 
figures should have been larger still had there not 
been obstacles to trade on either side. 
(1) Thts petcentogee IS the same as for France but only one-third 
of th.H of tht: Benelux countnes. 
FEC (cxcludmg mtra-Community trade) : 9.3 per cent; United 
StJtes : 4 9 per cent. 
J<lpJneo;;e export<; repre~ent, at the same time, 12 per cent of 
the overall world ttade. 
EEC imports from japan 
80 per cem of imports cover manufactured 
prodttcts which, in 1958, represented only two-thirds 
of imports. The increase in the share of industrial 
products entailed a reduction in the share of primary 
pro:lucts and, in particular, raw materials which 
fell from 20 to 5 per cent of imports. In terms of 
value imports have shown a very limited increase 
since 1958 (from $24m to $34m). The position is 
different in regard to foo:lstuffs, where imports 
rose by 318 per cent as a result of the very much 
h·ger purchases of fish and vegetable preserves. 
Imports of chemical products recorded a 
spectacular increase of 852 per cent but remain low 
in terms of value ( $43m in 1968). The rise was 
even greater for plant and transport equipment 
(1,000 per cent). These relate in particular to tele-
communication equipment, machinery for the tex-
tile industry and small electrical appliances or 
apparatus. With regard to transport equipment, 
purchases of ships form the largest part. However, 
sales of Japanese motor cars have also increased 
very markedly during the last two years. The share 
of machinery and transport equipment is now 15 to 
26 per cent of total imports. 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles amount to 
half of all imports from Japan. Purchases of articles 
of th:J.t category increased by 510 per cent. Imports 
of articles which have considerably increased are: 
photographic and precision instruments, iron and 
steel products, fine pearls, textile products and, to 
a lesser extent, toys. 
EEC exports to ]apa11 
Industrial products cot•er more th,m 85 per cetzt 
of exportr. The development of exports has been 
much more steady than that of imports in the sense 
that, with the exception of the group of miscel-
hneous manufactured articles, all categories of goods 
hwe shown identical rates of growth. 
Sales of food rt~tffs increased by 3 30 per cent but 
their proportion in rehtion to total exports remained 
unchanged at 9.4 per cent. The range is varied 
but there is an increase in sales of cocoa and con-
centrated milk products. Deliveries of raw materials 
went up by 175 per cent but are only less than 
3.5 per cent of exports. 
\'V'hile in most countries sales of products in 
the 'miscellaneous manufactured articles' group 
developed less rapidly thJ.n those of chemicals, 
machinery and transport equipment, a distinct feat-
ure of exports to ]c:pc~7l has been the exceptio11al 
det'elopme7/t of sales of articles of that group. 
There was a remarkable surge in the rate of growth 
of these sales which reached the figure of 753 per 
cent, the share of these products in total exports 
having gone ·up from 12 per cent in 1958 to 23 per 
11 
cent in 1968. Expansion was quite remarkable, too, 
in 1967 when sales went up by 75 per cent as 
compared with 1966. This was due to the develop-
ment in sales of non-ferrozts metals, diamonds, 
precision imtmments and a very large number of 
consttmer articles. In 1968, however, there was a 
drop in sales of 30 per cent as compared with 1967. 
Despite a less marked progress (363 per cent), 
the machinery and transport equipment group 
continues to provide the largest part of exports to 
Japan. However, this proportion remains at 37 per 
cent. During the last ten years, the Community 
increased its sales of office equipment, machinery 
for the textile industry or other specialized indus-
tries, and a variety o£ electrical appliances and motor 
vehicles. Sales of chemicals having only augmented 
by 240 per cent, their share in exports dropped 
from 35 to 25 per cent. Special reference should 
be made to sales of pharmacettticals. 
japan's nzam exports to the EEC(l) 
Electrical machinery and appliances 
Iron and steel products 
Precision instruments 
Textiles 
Chemicals 
Oils and animal seeds 
Clothing 
Transport equipment 
Fish 
Fruit and vegetable preserves 
Unmanufactured tobacco 
Silk 
Toys 
7,027 
2,943 
9,091 
21,939 
15,639 
10,338 
6,047 
20,671 
5,510 
3,124 
18' Ill 
6,035 
(1) Ftgures m br<1ckets were supphcd by the Commtssion of the Europt:JJl Commumttes. 
1960 
(id.) 
(5' 813) 
(9' 327) 
(22,264) 
(id.) 
(id.) 
(id) 
(523) 
(id.) 
(5,504) 
(ld.) 
(id.) 
(id.) 
EEC'S mam exports to ],tpan(l) 
Machinery, tools, transport equipment 
Chemicals 
Foodstuffs, excitant and stimulating products (including tobacco) 
Iron and steel products 
1\Iiscellaneous manufactured products 
Raw materials 
Energizing products 
70,607 
68,173 
10,019 
5,083 
(1) Figures in brackets were supplied by the CommissiOn of the European Commumttc<>. 
japan's external trade 
Import 
195g I 
\Yorld 100 
EEC 4.5 
USA 27.8 
United Kingdom 1.8 
South East Asia -
Australia and South Pacific Islands -
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1960 
1968 
100 
5 
(80,254) 
(id) 
(ll '359) 
( ... ) 
(31 '680) 
(.11' 307) 
(854) 
27.2 
1.9 
15.4 
8 
75,298 
72,504 
58,376 
52,825 
51,233 
19,430 
51,425 
16,582 
5,937 
1,754 
14,361 
274,882 
189,887 
67,084 
(in $1,000) 
1968 
(123' 757) 
(70' 646) 
(51,653) 
(39' 305) 
(44,481) 
(4,806) 
(21' 073) 
(48' 395) 
(id.) 
(9,862) 
(7' 736) 
(4,940) 
(26, 766) 
(m $1,000) 
1967 
(241' 913) 
(163' 558) 
(56' 243) 
( ... ) 
(145 '613) 
( ... ) 
(l' 166) 
Export 
1958 I 1968 
100 100 
4 4.7 
23.4 31.5 
3.4 2.8 
- 27.2 
- 3.7 
II-Position of trade relations between 
the me.mber States and Japan(!) 
a) Bilateral agreements 
18. On 14 May 1963 France concluded a six-year 
trade agreement with Japan. This contains the 
most-favoured nation clause and the safeguard 
clause. Inclusion of the latter clause was obtained 
by France in exchange for renouncing the right it 
had secured when Japan joined GATT to apply to 
that country the provisions of Article XXXV of 
GATT(2). 
The agreement covers 59 import quotas and 6 
open quotas for imports into French overseas 
territories. 
France is at present negotiating the renewal of 
the agreement. 
Italy concluded trade arrangements with Japan 
on 29 July 1961 and 13 July 1965. These provide 
for certain quota liberalizations or extensions. The 
arrangements are valid for one year and will be 
tacitly renewe.:l until further arrangements are 
entered into. 
The Benelux countries have regular and success-
ful dealings with Japan on the basis of the agree-
ment of 8 October 1960. The Protocols of 
13 February 1963 and 3 May 1966 are in force. 
The period for which the agreement is valid is 
three years each time, unless otherwise agreed; 
basically it is similar to the Franco-Japanese Agree-
ment of 1963. The Benelux customs area has 
applied a quota system on imports of products 
covered by 22 tariff items and 'ex' items of the 
Brussels Nomenclature and, in addition, the Benelux 
customs area may, since the coming into force of 
the 1963 Protocol, apply a safeguard clause. (This 
clause was obtained un:.ler the same conditions as 
Frar:ce.) 
The Federal Republic of Germmzy signed on 
1 July 1960 a trade agreement with Japan for a 
period of one year only but with the possibility of 
tacit renewal. This agreement is based on the non-
discrimination rule of GATT; at the end of 1962 
an additional Protocol was drawn up to cover pro-
ducts to be liberalized on 1 January 1965. The 
Protocol also laid down the number of quotas that 
would be maintained; there are 15 such quotas at 
present, excluding cotton textiles. 
On 5 October 1962 a special convention on the 
importation into the Federal Republic of Germany 
of cotton textiles was concluded on the basis of 
the World Cotton Agreement; the convention 
(1 ) See Enclo<ure V of the report by the Commission to the Coun-
Cil of 28 3.69 (Sec (C9) 1175 fm.); Note to Members PE 22 
9S9. 
(.!) ~ome 15 member countnes of GATT still invoke the provisions 
of Article XXXV. Thi< gave nse at the end of January 1970 
to an official protest from Japan, whiCh is threatening to slow 
down hberahzat10n measures if th1s situatton is not changed, 
includes, in particular, import quotas in respect of 
these products. It has been replaced since the 
above-mentioned date by the agreement referred to 
in Chapter II. 
19. To sum up, it may be said that all trade 
agreements of EEC member States with Japan, 
which are at present in force, could have been 
denounced in 1969 since they all include the EEC 
clause of 1961(1); this should make it easier to 
replace them by a single Community agreement 
They include in addition a whole series of quotas 
for imports into the EEC. Moreover, the French 
and Italian agreements provide for six and seven 
quotas ·respectively for imports into Japan. The 
other two agreements contain a promise on the 
part of the Japanese authorities to issue, for certain 
products, fairly liberal import licences. Only the 
Franco-Japanese and Benelux-Japan agreements 
(which Japan approved when, in 1963, these coun-
tries renounced the right which they were retain-
ing since Japan joined GATT, to resort to 
Article XXXV which provides for the possibility 
of not applying GATT provisions to trade with a 
given partner) contain a safeguard clause (Protocols 
of 14 May and 13 February 1963). 
The four agreements referred to above are 
undoubtedly very similar to one another in various 
respects, particularly with regard to import quotas. 
However, owing to the fact that one of them only 
has a safeguard clause, intra-Conmztmity trade would 
remain sttbject to obstacles if these agreements were 
not replaced by a Community agreement. 
b) Restrictiom 011 mtttual trade 
20. As we have seen earlier on, trade agreements 
between Japan and the EEC are still largely 
governed on either side by quota systems and fur-
ther liberalization must remain one of the very 
first aims of future negotiations. 
In order to illustrate this aspect of the situation 
Annex I to this ·report shows the present position 
regarding the main quantitative restrictions applied 
by the EEC( 4). 
The full list of products subject to a quota 
system from one or several member States for 
imports from Japan comprises about 90 tariff items, 
55 of which are four-figure items and 35 'ex' items. 
('l Bv authom.ltlon of the Council dated 1 July 1969, the agree-
ments of the Federal Republic. France and the Benelux coun-
tries with Japan may be renewed; this does not apply to the 
ltal1.1n 'arrangement' which is not an official trade agreement. 
('1) In this respect a d1stmction should be mJde between discrimi-
n<uory and non-d1scnmmatory restrictions, 1.e. between re-
stncnono;; that applv only to Imports from a given country (e.g. 
]ap.1n) and those that applv, e1g(l omnes, that is, to all imports 
"hJtevcr the origm of the goods. We find these two types of 
restnctwn m the case under consideration. 
Annex I mentions dt<>cnmmatory quotas only. 
It should be ob<erved that abolltlon or, at least, reduction of 
di'>crinunatory restnctwns IS pr~scnbed by Articles I to XI of 
GATT but that the bilateral agreements concluded with Japan by 
France .ulll the Benelux countries when these renounced their 
nght to .1pply Article XXXV of GATT do not run counter to 
the'.ie :pnnCiples. 
13 
In other words, it may be said that about two-
thirds of noJ!-liberalized imports into the Commu-
nity are from Japan(!). 
This fact clearly demonstrates the extent to 
which the continued liberalization(2) of Commu-
nity imports depends on the laying down of more 
precise regulations for Japan. 
21. Conversely, Japan has applied an import 
quota system for about 120 tariff or 'ex' tariff posi-
tions. Admittedly, these 120 items include about 
10 which, for special reasons, are explicitly embodied 
in bilateral agreements with Community coun-
tries(x), but in principle these quotas are valid 
'erga oJmtes'. As a matter of fact, Japan intends to 
liberalize independently half of these quotas by the 
end of 1971; it has already fixed most of the items 
that are to be liberalized(4). 
22. The latest report on the implementation of 
Article 115 of the EEC Treaty(") indicates the 
particuhr Japanese products that are excluded from 
Community treatment. 
A comparison between quota products and those 
for which recourse is had in the Community to 
Article 115 of the EEC Treaty shows that in all 
cases (with the exception of Item 20.02-asparagus) 
where Article 115 is applied, a quota system already 
exists. These are, therefore, products whose 'sen-
sitivity' can hardly be in doubt. 
c) Semiti1'e prodttcts 
23. Certain products play a special part in the 
trade relations between the Six and Japan. These 
are: 
Cotton textiles 
Ceramic products 
Footwear 
Umbrellas 
Cutlery 
Ball-bearings 
Non-ferrous metal 
Motor vehicles 
Coal and steel 
Nuclear energy 
(1) Tmports from Statc-tradmg countnes arc also subJect to an 
t":tc!l)tn:- quota :-.ystLm. 
( 2) The re.1l eftect of quot.1s h, naturally, only determined in part 
bY rhnr num!)et; .1ccount mu'>t ,:d<>o be taken of their volume 
. wd oi the que~tJOn whether the m.ukct concerned ca.n absorb a 
greater yolume nf Import'>. 
(JJ Sec Annex II ot th1., report. 
( tJ Th1s will t.li"e .1 problem tor the Community a<; teiations between 
J~lp.Ul and It.llv .He not, to .1 certam extent, quite norm.1l yet. 
("I Offu·hli G,,~ette No. C 95/63; Position as at 1 June 1969; see 
Annex III of thrs tLport. 
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Cotton textiles 
24. At the close of the discussions between dele-
gations of the member States and the Executive 
which began in March of this year, the member 
States reached the conclusion, at the end of June, 
that conditions were right for starting negotiations 
on the basis of Article 4 of the long-term agreement 
on world trade m cotton textiles (World Cotton 
Agreement). The negotiations led to the signing 
on 22 October 1969 of bilateral agreements of a 
conventicnal type between the member States and 
Japan. These agreements are valid until 30 Sep-
tember 1970 ( ~;). They provide for a wider opening 
of the six markets and a more liberal administration, 
by product, of quotas applicable to Japanese cotton 
textiles. 
The following quotas were agreed: 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Benelux 
6,000 tons 
2,650 tons 
1,600 tons 
1,200 tons 
Total 11,450 tons 
Initially, the negotiations were jointly conducted 
by the member States and the Executive with Japan. 
They dealt with the total volume of quotas to be 
authorized and the way they were to be controlled. 
Subsequently, the volume of each quota was fixed 
in the six capitals. 
The agreements came into force retro-actively on 
1 October 1969('). 
Ceramic prodttcts 
25. With regard to the products in Chapter 69(R) 
of the Brussels Nomenclature, the Executive sub-
mitted to the Council, in April 1969, a proposal for 
a uniform Community import system (excluding 
State-trading companies) for a fuller implementation 
of the regulations on quantitative import quotas, the 
common liberalization lists and the special proce-
dure for importing certain products from certain 
third countries('). 
We are thus confronted with one of the first 
cases of organization accordmg to sector of 'a com-
mon import policy'; in practice, its geographical 
field of application remains restricted to Japan and 
Hongkong. Three of the four EEC customs areas 
now apply restrictive measures in this respect; Japan 
has undertaken to restrict its exports to the Federal 
Republic of Germany (self-limiting agreements). 
('~I See the agreement~ "-·onduded With IndJa and P,Ikistan, Offictal 
C:,;~,·ttc, L 238 '69, p. 8 The World Cotton Agreement also 
,·-..:p'!C'<.. on 30 September lY'O . 
('J Decl'>Ion on the v.1bdrrv penod of the<>e .1greemcnts: Offtcial 
G,~::.cttc L .~81 69, p. ?6. 
('~'} A'> well .1s an :tem of ChJ.pter B5-cer.ltnlc insulators. 
(''I RegubtJoP; No. 2041, 2043 and 2054168; Official Gazette L 
301 68. (800 tantf Jtems ,lfc .lt pte;cnt Iibeohzed by the Com-
mumty, 297 .uc not). 
.. 
' . 
.. 
It is intended to liberalize(!) imports of pro-
ducts in Chapter 69 covered by such a measure, to 
place other products under some kind of 'st!per-
vision' and to make the remaining products liable 
to q11otas. As this system could lead to a unilateral 
increase of import opportunities for Japan, the Exec-
utive propose to liberalize only in so far as restric-
tive provisions on certain products require compen-
sation within the Community; in other words, 
Japan's position as an importer would generally 
remain unchanged. In case this liberalization were 
to be pursued, the Community would open negotia-
tions with Japan in order to secure equivalent con-
cessions. As exports of these products are important 
for Japan, this procedure has some chance of success. 
The proposals of the European Commission pro-
vide for the following measures in respect of the 
various products concerned: 
iJ Setts and paving tiles (Items 69.07 and 69.08) 
liberalization of common earthenware products 
(except for quotas applymg to Japan) in 
1,000 sq.m. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Benelux 
Community reserve 
ii) Porcelain or china tableware 
3,325 
42 
20 
43 
180 
3,610 
Quotas for china and earthenware imports 
(Items 69.11 and 69.12 c) originating in Japan, 
in tons 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Benelux 
Community reserve 
Typical oriental pottery (in tons) 
2,160 
225 
1,980 
2,205 
730 
7,300 
Federal Republic of Germany 1,600 
Community reserve 160 
-'supervision system' for any Japanese ceramic 
crockery other than china (Item 69.12 A, B and 
D); and for any other crockery originating in 
Honkong; 
-for products of another origin an automatic 
import licence system has been suggested. 
iii) Statuettes 
'supervision system' for Japan: import licences 
automatically granted for products of a differe11t 
origin. 
(1 ) Items 69.01 to 69.06 .md 69.14 are .1lready liberalized. 
iv) Insulators 
see (iii) 
From a legal viewpoint, the liberalization should 
be carried out by means of 'recommendations to 
the member States under Article 111,5 of the EEC 
Treaty. Import quotas and the 'supervision system' 
should be fixed by means of regulations. 
Footwear 
26. Proposals for an entirely independent import 
system were put forward in July 1969 (Items 64.01 
and 64.02). 
These cover: · 
the liberalization of imports of leather, rubber 
and plastic shoes 
quantitative quotas for Japan (1,579,000 pairs) 
and Hongkong (7 ,3 5 3,000 pairs) for textile 
shoes with rubber or plastic soles 
Quotas for Japan (in 1,000 pairs) 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Benelux 
Community reserve 
990 
205 
5 
220 
159 
1,579 
the introduction of a 'supervision system' for 
shoes with rubber soles and for indoor shoes 
originating in Japan and Hongkong. 
Umbrellas 
27. At the same time, it was suggested for 
Items 66.01 and 66.03 of the Brussels Nomenclature: 
to liberalize imports whilst introducing: 
a 'supervision system' for terrace parasols and 
parasol-tents originating in Japan and Honkong 
a quota system for umbrellas and parasols ori-
ginating in Japan (3,672,000) and Honkong 
(2,500,000); distributed as follows for Japan (in 
1,000 units) · 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Benelux 
Community reserve 
C11tlery 
2,625 
55 
32 
660 
300 
3,672 
28. This proposal concerns table knives as well 
as stainless steel spoons and forks (Items 82.09 and 
82.14 A) and implies: 
the liberalization of these items, together with 
the introduction of 
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a quota system for imports originating in Japan, 
fixed as follows (in tons): 
Knives Spoons 
and forks 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 400 1,570 
France 30 190 
Italy 10 10 
Benelux 210 540 
Communtiy reserve 70 260 
720 2,570 
Ball-bearings 
29. Italy applies a quota system on imports of 
this product (Item 821.62) from Japan, while France 
and the Benelux countries are in a position to 
resort to a safeguard clause. As Japan exports only 
certain types of ball-bearings, at prices which are 
only about 65 per cent of Community prices 
(imports from Japan correspond to 12 per cent of 
Community production), the European Commission 
suggested: 
a liberalization of this tariff item, combined 
with 
a 'supervision system' for imports from Japan. 
Motor cars 
30. There is, in the context of the Kennedy 
Round of negotiations, a problem which has not 
yet been settled: Japan declared its readiness to 
apply the 50 per cent tariff reduction, agreed to by 
all, to its motor car imports on condition that Italy 
accepted to import more Japanese motor cars(l ). As 
Italy has not done so, Japan only applies a tariff 
reduction varying from 30 to 40 per cent. 
Non-ferrous metal 
31. Japan and the Community have a comparable 
position on the world market of non-ferrous 
ore-that of large importers. Their main concern 
at the moment is that of obtaining supplies of 
copper ores. 
In 1964, as a result of growing demand, supplies 
of lead and zinc ores became difficult to secure. 
Negotiations were started and close co-operation, on 
the basis of private agreements, begun between 
Japanese and EEC copper-smelting works, in partic-
ular in connexion with interventions on the Lon-
don ore market. The talks between the two parties 
dealt with the question of supplies, the opening of 
(1) Italy ;hould hO\'e authonzed the importation of 1,000 cars in 
1968, 2,500 car; m 1969 and should have entirely liberalized 
this tanff Item from 1970. 
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new mines and price stabilization. It was subse-
quently decided to hold these talks at regular 
intervals(2). 
Coal and steel 
32. To give a full picture of the position and to 
bring into relief Japan's importance in the economic 
context, we would refer to the agreement concluded 
on 11 May 1965 between the ECSC (High Author-
ity) and Japan. The agreement was to the effect 
that joint talks would be held on the situation in 
the iron and steel and mining industries, the con-
sumption of the various products, supplies of raw 
materials and the development of technical and 
scientific research(3 ). 
Since the merger of the three Executives, these 
six-monthly consultations with the Japanese Govern-
ment have been pursued by the European Com-
mtsswn. 
It should be borne in mind here that m order 
to manufacture its iron and steel products, Japan 
has to import large quantities of ore and coal. 
Lastly, it should also be observed that the Shin 
Nippon Seitetsu Company which resulted from the 
merger of the Yawata and Fuji firms is now the 
world's largest steel concern after United States Steel 
Corporation. 
N~tclear energy 
33. In its 7th General Report (1963/64), the 
former Euratom Commission refers to proposals 
made by Japan in 1962 for closer co-operation in 
the nuclear field. A project for an arrangement in 
respect of the exchange of information was drawn 
up(4) but never carried into effect. The contacts 
that have taken place were not of an 'institutional' 
nature. 
The recent association (in May 1969) of a 
consortium of 23 Japanese firms with the British 
Nuclear Power Group shows that Japan is not 
against co-operation in the nuclear field. This 
agreement covers production in Japan and the sale 
of gas-cooled reactors. 
According to some sources, Japan has also 
recently developed a technique of isotope seperation 
based on the ultra-centrifugation method. 
(2) Attention 1s dra\\·n to this point because the EEC Commission 
had previOuslY submitted a 'memo' to the Council on the lead 
.:md Zinc questiOn. The memo suggested the immediate cre-
J.twn of a common mJ.rket for these products (from which the 
Italian market would be rsolated, under Article 226 of the EEC 
Tre.uy), as well as a reductiOn of the Common Customs Tariff 
for these two r"1w materi.1ls and a general hberaltzatwn (except 
tor lead and nnc from State-trading countnes). (Doc. 1/III/COM 
(63) 23 dd of 13.2.63). 
The proposeJ measures never c.1me into force. 
I") 15th ECSC General Report, para. 54. 
( 4) EAEC 7th Ge11er.zl Report, para. 83. 
', 
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III-Respective standpoints in regard 
to negotiations 
a) Japan's position 
34. Japan's interest in establishing closer trade 
relations with the EEC is both political and economic 
The political interest can be accounted for by 
the fact that Japan has risen to the rank of the most 
economically powerful nations and wishes, conse-
quently, to establish links with the other great 
powers of the world. Moreover, after having m~inly 
turned to the United States in the post-war vean 
Japan is now endeavouring to diversify its rel~tion~ 
with other countries. 
Japan's main trading partners are the United 
States, Australia and a number of South East Asian 
countries (the westernmost of which is Burma), 
Europe and the Soviet Union. Japan's total exports 
amount to about $13,700m. Only 5.6 per cent of 
that figure, i.e. $775m, relates to exports to the 
EEC. In view of its high annual economic expan-
sion rate (15 per cent approx.), Japan tends to 
widen the scope of its export possibilities in all sec-
tors. It should be observed in this respect that the 
Japan/USA trade balance shows a surplus of 
$1,500m in favour of Japan. This is a matter about 
which the two parties feel concerned, all the more 
so as the USA, which takes up one third of Japan's 
exports, may have to restrict its imports in future 
as a result of the general position of its balance of 
payments. 
35. Just as the Community does with regard to 
Japan, the latter fixes quotas for its imports from 
the EEC countries. A particular feature of these 
quotas is that they are Ot'erall quotas, i.e. quotas 
which apply irrespective of the origin of the goods. 
This explains, for example, why the negotiations 
recently initiated (Spring 1969) between Japan and 
the Benelux countries have not been very successful: 
Japan is unable to offer any counterpart to possible 
concessions from the Benelux countriese ). 
This means, in principle, that Japan could hardly 
make a concession to a given partner in regard to 
increased imports. It would then either have to 
increase the overall quota (which, however, gives no 
assurance to the partner that it will get the benefit 
of the additional import possibility thus created) or 
replace the overall quota by quotas for all its supply 
partners (in which case the overall nature of the 
quota would no longer apply)e). 
(1) It should be pomted out th~t the granting of overall quot~s is 
nmLh more m accmdance wtth GATT provisions than the 
.1lternattvc method, 1.c. issuing dtscrirnmatory quotas. 
(2) It would .1ppear that, in pucnce, greater import facilities are 
obtamed by tC<.,enmg a (larger) number of import licences 
\YhiLh, after all, IS t.lntamount to some extent to a breaking 
up of the oYerJ.ll quotas. In one particular case, however, tlus 
method can be avorded, viz. when conccsstons can be obtained 
for products for wluch the two parties concerned arc each 
other'<> m.un ~uppher-;, or when it is possible, on either side, 
to resort to sateguatd clauses as soon as the mutual import 
yolum~s tend to sho\V .;;mne d1spanty. 
36. About 80 per cent of Japan's trade is handled 
by eight trade organizations (shoshas); they act on 
behalf of small and medium-sized companies which 
have no direct agents abroad. These organizations 
tend to remain faithful to their traditional suppliers. 
Furthermore, they are connected with the big banks 
to which the groups of companies (zaibatsus) in 
turn are linked( 3). The inter-penetration of inter-
ests is all the more extensive as Japan's economy is 
highly integrated. Account must, therefore, be 
taken of the fact that the spheres concerned in Japan 
have some influence over the import policy; in any 
case, the number of economic circuits is smaller 
than in the West. 
Import licences are issued by the public author-
lUes. The procedure is somewhat complicated and 
there is room for improvement, at times, in the 
announcements relating to the opening of quotas 
or to the department(s) responsible for issuing 
licences(4 ). 
These peculiarities may only constitute minor draw-
backs when imports are made by Japanese importers; 
one gets the impression, however, that non-Japanese 
exporters seeking new openings come up against 
greater obstacles on the Japanese market than on 
other external markets. In so far as the shoshas have 
a wide network of connexions, they can also, of 
course, be quite useful in certain cases to the poten-
tial exporters. 
As for the Community's chances of developing 
its exports to Japan, it should be observed, in con-
nexion with the para-tariff and non-tariff obstacles 
referred to above, that foodstuffs and raw materials 
would be the main products exported; finished and 
semi-finished products constitute only one third of 
total Japanese exports. In addition, the present 
situatton on the world market is such that not only 
the EEC, but also Britain and the USA are sparing 
no effort to increase their exports to Japan. The 
possibilities of developing Community exports to 
Japan should, therefore, not be overestimated(5). 
37. With regard to negotiations with the EEC, 
the Japanese Government consider that these should 
at least lead to the abolition of the discriminatory 
import quotas (i.e. the quotas which only apply 
to imports from Japan) referred to in the bilateral 
agreements concluded by the member States with 
Japan(G). 
The Japanese Government is reluctant to extend 
safeguard measures to all member States. The point 
it makes is that the two member States that had 
agreed to such measures in respect of their trade 
with Japan have only very rarely-two or three 
times-applied them in the past. Furthermore, 
there is no such clause in force in respect of Japan's 
very large trade with the USA. This is why Japan 
(J) e g 1.1ltsut, lvhtsubishi, Sumitomo, etc. 
(1) Thts c.1n mduectly cause some difficulty in regard to licences, 
modele,, de. 
C') See .1hcnc, para. 17, sub. v. 
(") Thete 1s no trade agreement between Italy and Japan. 
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would prefer to restrict the safeguard clauses to the 
cases provided for by GATT. It may be ass11med 
that it is ot•er this particular poi1lt that negotiations 
will be diffht~lt(l ). 
The bilateral agreements concluded between 
Japan and individual member States contain special 
provisions which are not always in accordance with 
GATT rules. Bearing in mind all these aspects, 
including para-tariff and non-tariff obstacles, it may 
be said that neither Japan nor the member States 
fully comply in their trade relations with GATT's 
principles. In this respect, therefore, both parties 
should endeavour to pursue the normalization of 
conditions in the sense required by GATT. In 
addition, Japan is aware of the fact that it will have 
to give material satisfaction to the EEC if it wishes 
the latter to remove discriminatory restrictions and 
to extend the remaining quotas. 
38. In connexion with the foregoing, it is also 
necessary to look into Japan's policy with regard to 
capital imports and exports and investment move-
ments, that is Japanese investments abroad and 
foreign investment in Japan. 
Attention should first be drawn to the problem 
of the yen's convertibilitye). In this connexion, 
Japan insists on the fact that it must have control 
over certain capital exports of a speculative nature. 
On the other hand, there is no difficulty in obtaining 
foreign currency for commercial transactions. In 
addition, the liberalization of income gains in Japan 
by non-residents is practically complete(~). 
Furthermore, Japanese investors abroad have 
ceen given greater freedom of action. Since July 
1969 they can invest, without any authorization, up 
to $200,000 instead of $50,000 as previously. 
Japan's foreign investments, from April 1968 to 
March 1969, amounted to $541m. 
However, the requirement of a minimum Japan-
ese share of SO per cent ('half-partnership') in 
foreign investments in Japan remains in force. 
These liberalization measures are due to the fact 
that Japan's gold and foreign currency reserves 
amounted to $3,500m at the end of 1969 and will 
go up to $4,000m by the end of 1970. 
b) EEC's positio1z 
39. The present position of the Community with 
regard to trade policy may be summarized as 
follows: · 
i) In relation to the GATT countries the Commu-
nity stands as a single entity since the completion 
(1 ) See above, pua. 49. 
I") $ 1 ~ .160 vens 
('') On 1 Sept~mber 1969 most of the restncnons on capital and 
mcome transfers of fore1gn firms established in Japan were 
hfted (on condltlon thJt these firms were established in Japan 
before I Julv 1963); foreign salary-earners residmg in Japan, or 
h .. wmg left the counrn·, may no\v convert and transfer out of 
Japan 30 per cent of their blocked assets. (See also OECD, 
Doc. TIR (69) 5 of 26 September 1969.) 
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of the Kennedy Round of negotiatiOns and the 
coming into force of the common customs tariff; 
this refers, of course, to trade mainly governed by 
customs tariffs. 
ii) The question of trade with State-trading coun-
tries is only partly settled( 4 ). 
iii) The question of trade with Japan, largely 
affected by quotas, can also not be regarded as 
settled. 
The Kennedy negot1atzons have not solved the 
basic question of the obstacles to trade between 
Japan and the EEC, in other words, the removal of 
existing quotas on either side. The only satisfactory 
results achieved so far relate to tariffs. 
Trade relations between Japan and the EEC(5) 
would not be possible if the two parties did not find 
it of mutual interest. The attitude of both the 
Commission of the European Communities and the 
Japanese Government leaves no doubt as to the 
mutual resolve to start negotiations; the conclusions 
drawn from the recent talks (11 September 1969) 
between Mr. Aichi and Mr. Rey have clearly 
demonstrated that resolve. It should also be men-
tioned that unlike, for example, the State-trading 
countries (or at least most of them), Japan 
recognizes the Community as such, which will make 
negotiations considerably easier. 
40. We have already(n) examined the standpoint 
taken by the ex-EEC Commission at the beginning 
of 1960. This may be summed up as follows: 
achieving the customs union of the Six and, in 
particular, progressively abolishing internal borders 
and setting up at the same time a common external 
frontier would make it necessary to standardize 
import and export systems. This opinion was con-
firmed by the facts. 
41. The customs union of the Six became a prac-
tical reality on 1 July 1968. A single customs tariff 
rs applied at the common external frontier and 
internal duties have been abolished. Current efforts 
aim at abolishing the other duty 'components' 
(fiscal, health and sanitation, etc. as well as a small 
number of intra-Community quotas for certain 
agricultural products) which are still applicable on 
the internal frontiers. These also still operate in 
regard to goods covered by import systems which 
vary from one member country to another. In this 
respect we refer in particular to: 
a) quotas, and 
b) the implementation of Article 115 of the Treaty 
setting up the EEC (exclusion from what has 
been decribed as 'the Community treatment') 
('I See, for example. RegulatiOn No. 2045/68 and Council Deci-
sion No 69 494 
(") \X'Jth regard to the attitude to Japan of the ECSC and the 
EAEC, see p,lf,l. 32 above, 
(") See pua;. 1 to 8 above. 
I' 
' . 
c) application of safeguard clauses deriving (but 
not entirely ! ) from the present bilateral agree-
ments with Japan. 
42. It may be assumed from the table of present 
import restrictions (quotas) (1): 
that none of the six member States have lifted 
import controls on goods from Japan covered by 
ten items of the Brussels Nomenclature; that 
three of the four customs areas have not liber-
alized these imports for nine other items. 
In addition, imports from Japan are subject to 
quotas: 
In France, for more than 30 items 
In the Fed. Rep. of Germany, for more than 
10 items 
In Italy, for more than 50 items 
In the Benelux countries, for more than 
10 items. 
The survey(!) of the extent to which Article 115 
of the EEC Treaty (exclusion from the 'Community 
treatment') is applied shows that the Article has 
been invoked 
by France m 1 case, 
by Italy in 15 cases, 
by the Benelux in 2 cases. 
In three of the four customs areas of the Com-
munity, Article 115 has been applied for Item 
No. 69.08 (tiles and paving-stones). 
It should be recalled in this connexion that the 
quota system and Article 115 are often applied 
Jlon-concttrremly. the two measures being com-
plementary. 
There is therefore in respect of Item No. 69.08 
of the Common Customs Tariff some measure of 
consistency (albeit negative) in the import policy 
of the member States; some of these, however, are 
also authorized to restrict their imports from Japan 
for a large number of other products; in such cases 
the products are imported on their own initiative 
(i.e. not via other member States). 
43. The import systems of the Six are anything 
but consistent, and this hampers the satisfactory 
working of the customs unione). Standardization 
in the sense meant here would certainly be most 
useful to the Community and of considerable help 
to Japan. 
Franse and, above all, Italy have, up till now, 
always shown some reservations as to possible 
(1) Sec above, para 20 et ~eq., and Annexes to th1s report. 
(2) Th1~ Jlso apphcs to 1mports from State-trading countries 
negotiations with Japan. This was already their 
attitude to proposals made by the former EEC 
Commission in 1963 and 1964. 
Conversely, Japan deplored the fact that Italy 
had been authorized, under the regulation(3) on 
setting up a common liberalization list for 
imports into the Community, unilaterally to 
introduce quotas for about 50 Japanese products 
without having to follow the consultation pro-
cedure on the Council. 
Lastly, reference should also be made here 
to the problem raised by imports of Japanese 
motor vehicles into Italy in the framework of 
the Kennedy negotiations( 4 ). 
44. On 10 Nol'ember 1969, the Council of 
Ministers authorized the Commission to initiate 
exploratory talks with the Japanese Government 
with a view to assessing the possibilities of starting 
negotiations and, hence, reaching an agreement. 
According to the Council, such an agreement should: 
i) increase mutual trade and, as a result, contribute 
to a smooth expansion of world trade; 
ii) lead to the widest possible degree of liberaliza-
tion-on a progressive and mutual basis-and to 
the removal of other obstacles to trade, in partic-
ular administrative obstacles. 
The Council has in mind, in this respect, the 
Japanese quotas which that country's balance of 
payments no longer warrants in its opinion, as 
well as the administrative import provisions, in 
particular-but not exclusively-those which 
govern Japanese import quotas and which, m 
practice, have also a restrictive influence; 
iii) bring about the introduction, on both sides, of 
safeguard clauses which would make it possible 
to face, if need be, serious market disturbances. 
The degree of liberalization to which the Com-
munity could agree depends in practice on the 
extent to which this condition is met, particularly 
in view of the price level which the Japanese 
can maintain for certain products owing to the 
highly-integrated production methods they apply. 
It is expected that the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities will submit a report to the 
Council on the above-mentioned exploratory talks 
before 1 April 1970. It is also desirable that these 
questions be tackled as soon as possible because the 
present trade treaties between the member States and 
Japan were only extended, on 1 July 1969, until 
31 December 1970. 
The granting of this mandate represents in par-
ticular the first change in the attitude of France and 
Italy towards negotiations with Japan. 
(') Regulatwn No. 2041/68. 
(') Sec p.u-.1. 30 
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IV -Concluding remarks 
45. The aim of the first negotiating mandate 
referred to above is consequently to promote the 
normalization of mutual trade relations. The pro-
visions on imports, dealt with in Chapter II and 
provisionally considered as independent measures, 
will also be discussed during the proposed 
negotiations. 
The mandate is rather laconic with regard to the 
implementation on a wider scale of economic and 
trade co-operation between the EEC and Japan. 
Admittedly this aspect is partly embodied in the 
mandate. In so far as, following the general devel-
opment of world trade relations, but also as a result 
of an EEC-Japan agreement, the pattern of world 
trade would be somewhat modified, the importance 
of the co-operation under consideration cannot be 
underestimated. 
The European Parliame1~t would therefore urge 
the Commission of the Emopean Comnzltnities to 
e1zdem•ot£r to get this point of view accepted in the 
forthcoming talks, as well as by the Council. 
46. As mentioned earlier on, it is anticipated that 
in the course of the negotiations the Japanese will, 
in any case, ask for a larger measure of liberalization 
in respect of Japanese imports into the Community. 
In addition, they will raise problems closely bound 
up with imports of certain products. 
It should also be noted that, up to this very 
moment(!) the Japanese Government has not yet 
formally signified its agreement to the Community's 
negotiating mandate. 
The Community will raise the question of 
Japan's restrictions on imports and that of extending 
the safeguard measures to the whole of the 
Community. 
In any case, what really matters is that negotia-
tions should be started so that, i1z the near ft{tlfre, 
the two parties, by common co1zse1Zt, may gradttally 
bring their trade relatiom into lim with GATT's 
1Z01'!1lal rttles. 
47. The European Parliament feels, however, that 
it must also draw attention to certain other points 
which would certainly be apposite in a comprehen-
sive trade agreement and, at any rate, in a co-opera-
tion agreement of the type under consideration. 
Attention should also be given to questions 
deriving from the co1~ditiom of competition 
between the EEC and Japan, both of whom are 
large importers of various rau• materials and, in 
particular, non-ferrous ores. A form of co-operation 
(1) January 1970. 
20 
should be sought which would make it possible to 
promote the largely similar interests of the two 
parties. 
A comparable sector is that of Japanese ship-
buildmg, although the conditions of competition 
between Japan and the EEC seem less unequal than 
they were a few years ago (2). 
Finally, the European Parliament considers that 
it would be advisable to look into the possibilities 
afforded to Emopean i1westments in Japan. As is 
known, Japan has fairly free scope for investment in 
\'V estern Europe, while the reverse does not yet 
apply. Owing mainly to the already large American 
share in the Japanese economy, it would be a definite 
disadvantage to the Community if it could not 
obtain the same opportunities in Japan. 
In this respect, reference should be made to the 
restrictions on capital movements(3) in Japan and 
to the fact that the Japanese money market is large 
enough to cover investment requirements. 
48. It seems unlikely that the Community will 
be in a position, within the framework of the forth-
coming negotiations, immediately to introduce a 
general liberalization. The products referred to as 
sensitive(4 ) (i.e. for which independent import regu-
lations are suggested) would probably not lend them-
selv;es to such a project in the near future. The 
negotiations should mainly bear 01~ the final natttre 
of trade relatiom between the two parties. 
This would, as a matter of fact, raise an intra-
Community problem. Japan will presumably ask 
for compensations (in the form of a limitation of 
the Community's negative hst) before extending the 
safeguard clause to the four customs areas of the 
EEC. Yet such a limitation of the EEC's negative 
list can only be carried into effect if the member 
States that have already obtained the benefit of that 
clause through bilateral agreements are, they too, 
prepared to grant concessions. As, on the other 
hand, the negative Community list that will emerge 
from the negotiations will ceratinly not include all 
the products which are now subject to quotas in one 
or several member States, it will not be easy to find 
appropriate intra-Community compensations. 
This does not exclude the fact that, from the 
view-point of a freely-operating common market, 
negotiations should in any case also lead to the 
drawing up of a single Community negative list. 
49. It is particularly advisable, however, to estab-
lish quite clearly now that extending, to the whole 
of the Community, the safeguard clauses in respect 
of which two of the four Community customs areas 
have already reached bilateral agreement with Japan, 
t2 ) See Armengaud Report, Doc. 103/65-GC. In 1972, Japan will 
hUIId a 400,000-ton tanker (UP! of 29.12.69). 
H.1lf of the world's total sluppmg bmlt m 1968 came out of 
Japanese yards. 
(") Sec para. 38 aboYe 
1 'J See para,, 23 et seq. 
• I 
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should be the Community's mam objective in the 
negotiations(!). 
The provisions of the mandate of 10 November 
1969 on this point mainly refer to actual market 
disturbances. The Community will certainly agree 
that Japan, for its part, might also want to have 
recourse to such emergency measures. This means 
that the possibility of applying that clause should 
exist on both sides. 
On the other hand, sight should not be lost of 
the fact that the adding of a safeguard clause to an 
agreement such as the one under consideration 
must, above all, be regarded as a preventit•e measure. 
Experience gained on the matter, in particular in 
connexion with German-Japanese trade relations, 
shows that frequent application of this clause is 
hardly likely. The clause must rather be seen as a 
'voluntary self-limiting' principle, which is bound 
to play an increasingly important part in world 
trade as an appropriate and useful means of prevent-
ing market disturbances. 
It should also be clearly established at the outset 
that clauses of this type are neither designed nor 
may be used as a means of evading commitments 
('escape clause'). However if, despite this, the safe-
guard clauses were to be used as escape clauses, 
retaliatory measures on either side, with all the 
attendant drawbacks, would not be long in appearing. 
Neither party enjoys at present an entirely free 
trade system; it may be expected that negotiations 
will take place and that they will result in additional 
liberalization (or at least a timetable of further steps 
in that direction). The two parties will find them-
selves in a new situation: there will be closer contacts 
between the two economies and intensified commer-
cial relations but there might also emerge certain 
difficulties against which the two parties should 
protect themselves, for it must be recognized that 
there are undeniable differences between the 
respective economic structures. 
In that respect, the safeguard clauses may 
strengthen co-operation between the two parties. 
The European Parliament hopes, therefore, that 
negotiations will be successful on that point in 
particular. 
(1 ) See paras 3 and 37. 
Safeguard clauses of this type usually cover two contingencies, 
VIZ: 
a) a consultation procedure in case of serious difficulttes, 
b) a provisiOn for urgent cases; thts con·ststs in stopping 
Imports and mformmg the other party. 
Negotiations with Japan will require a consider-
able effort on the part of the Community and of 
some of its member States in particular. 
50. To sum up, it must be stated that it is in the 
interests of the Community to enter into such nego-
tiations with a view to (a) arriving at a single 
standard import system and (b) creating the pos-
sibility of expanding trade relations. This is a task 
which the authors of the Rome Treaty undertook to 
carry out in its Preamble. This task must be engaged 
upon all the more earnestly as the Community as 
such (i.e. as a market of 180 million people) is 
gradually replacing the individual member States 
in regard to world trade. 
It should be observed that greater liberalization 
of trade between the EEC and Japan will certainly 
also have a favourable effect on the trade of both 
parties with the United States and that, conversely, 
if the EEC and Japan were to adopt a protectionist 
attitude towards each other, this would induce the 
United States to increase its protectionism. These 
are obvious conclusions to be drawn from the fact 
that these three trading units all play an important 
part in world trade relations and that, as highly-
industrialized countries, their exports are bound to 
go, to a very large extent, to their mutual markets(2). 
If it is considered, on the other hand, that internal 
economic expansion is now only possible provided 
external trade does not cease to grow, the Commu-
nity must show readiness to 'pay' for greater possi-
bilities of selling European products on the Japan-
ese market by granting greater selling facilities to 
Japanese products on the market of the Six. 
The Community is today in a position to make 
an almost unique contributim~ to the development 
and balanced intensification of world trade (the two 
units concerned have, after all, 180 million and 
100 million inhabitants respectively) which is, in 
the final analysis, in the interests of our welfare and 
security. However, regardless even of that particular 
aspect, the results could not only lead to the eagerly 
desired unification of the trade systems of the six 
member States but also become an active element of 
the Community's trade policy, particularly in so far 
as the proposed agreement would have favourable 
effects on the whole of world trade. 
(2) It mll be recalled that in 1955 the United States was only able 
to ohtam certain concessiOns from Japan because the latter 
hJd been accorded concessions by certain countries of Europe. 
These agn:ed to granting concessions because they, in turn, 
had obtamed concess10ns from the United States (Curzon, 
GATT 1965). 
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ANNEX I 
A. Proudcts subject to quotas in all the EEC member States when imported from Japan(l) 
Sendl No. 
2 
3 
4-
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Comnwn Customs T ...tnff No 
51.0-i 
55.0\J 
50.07 
58.04-
60.05 
61.02 
(il. 05 
62.02 
09.11 
69.12 
Descnptron 
\Yoven fabncs of man-made fibres (continuous) 
Other woven fabrics of cotton 
\Yoven fabrics of man-made fibres (d1scontmuous or waste) 
\Voven pile fabncs and chemlle fabrics 
Outer garments and other articles, knitted or crocheted 
\\'omen's, girb' and mfants' outer garments 
HandkerchiE"fs 
Bed linen, table linen, toilet !men and kitchen !men 
Porcelain or china tableware and other articles of a kind 
commonly used for tmlet purposes 
Other kinds of pottery tableware and other articles of a kind 
commonlv used for tmlet purposes 
B. Products subject to quotas in three of the four EEC customs areas when imported 
from Japan(l) 
Seridl No. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Common Cu.;;;toms Tanff No. 
53.07 
53.11 
fl4.02 
69.07/08 
82.09/ 
8:l.14 i 
85.25 
Descnptwn 
Yarn of combed sheep's or lambs' wool (worsted yarn) 
\\'oven fabncs of sheep's or lambs' wool or of fme ammal hair 
Footwear with outer soles of leather or compositwn leather 
Unglazed and glazed sctts, flags and paving, hearth and wall 
tiles 
Kmves, spoons, forks, ladles and similar kitchen or table-
'vare 
Insulators of any material 
(1) See Annex V of Commisswn's Report to the Conncil of 18.3.69 (SEC (69) 1175 f111 ). Note to Members PE.22989. 
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Sen.-tl No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
EEC products subject to quotas when imported into Japan 
(under bilateral agreements) 
Common Customs Tc1.nff No. 
22.05 
22.06 
ex 29.44-2 ( 
ex 30.03-11 
ex 53.11 
ex 84.35-1 
ex 84 .41-l 
ex 84.51-1 
ex 93.04-
ex 93.04 
Dcscnption 
\\'ine of fresh grapes 
Vermouths, and other flavoured grape wines 
Cycloserine (Antibiotics) 
\\'oven fabncs of wool or half-wool 
Automatic printing machinery 
Industrial sewing machines 
European-model typewriters 
Non-automatic sportmg-guns 
R1fles and guns 
Application of EEC Treaty Article 115 to products from Japan 
ANNEX II 
ANNEX III 
Serial No. I Common Customs Ta.nff No. Product I France I ~e~;!~t I Italy I Benelux 
1 16.04 B to E Prepared or preserved fish, excluding caviar + 
2 ex 20.02 Asparagus + + 
3 37.02 Films + 
4 50.02 Raw silk + 
5 50.04 Silk yarn + 
6 50.09 ·woven fabrics of silk + 
7 ex 69.07 Mosaic setts + + 
8 ex 69.08 Sctts, flags and paving tiles + + + 
9 69.11 Porcelain or china tableware + 
10 85.03 Primary cells and batteries + 
11 ex 84.41 A Sewing machines + 
12 ex 85.15 A III Transistor radio receivers + 
13 ex 90.07 A Low-priced photographic cameras + 
14 ex 92.11 Magnetic tape recorders + 
15 ex 97.03 A Certain types of toys + 
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